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Mirror Neurons and Social Cognition*
Abstract: Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite such wide agreement, there is very little consensus on how or why they are important. The goal of this paper is to clearly explicate the exact role mirror neurons play in social cognition. I aim to answer two questions about the relationship between mirroring and social cognition: What kind of social understanding is involved with mirroring? How is mirroring related to that understanding? I argue that philosophical and empirical considerations lead us to accord a fairly minimal role for mirror neurons in social cognition.


“We suggest that mirror neurons are endowed with the precise properties allowing for complex remapping from one domain into another, which may lead to behaviors which arguably distinguish humans from all other animals, namely our abilities to interact socially, understand others’ thoughts and emotions, communicate using complex language, and the ability to reflect on ourselves… We suggest that the discovery of the mirror neuron system will do for psychology what DNA has done for biology” (Oberman and Ramachandran, 2009, p. 39).

1. Mirror Neurons
Mirror neurons are widely regarded as an important key to social cognition. Despite wide agreement that mirror neurons are important, there is very little consensus on how or why they are important. The goal of this paper is to clearly explicate the exact role mirror neurons play in social cognition. I aim to answer two questions about the relationship between mirroring and social cognition: What kind of social understanding is involved with mirroring? How is mirroring related to that understanding, e.g., does it constitute, cause, or merely correlate with social understanding? My goal is to articulate a philosophically and empirically plausible account of the role of mirror neurons in social cognition. I shall argue that philosophical and empirical considerations lead us to accord a fairly minimal role for mirror neurons in social cognition.
Mirror neurons are multi-modal neurons that fire during both execution and observation of actions. Mirror neurons were first discovered in monkeys using single-cell recordings.​[1]​ The single-cell studies on monkeys have been limited to motor areas of the brain. These studies revealed the presence of mirror neurons in areas F5 and PF of the monkey brain. Studies on humans mostly involve functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)​[2]​ and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS),​[3]​ not single-cell studies. A disadvantage of this difference between mirror neuron studies on monkeys and humans is that we lack definitive proof, in the form of single-cell recordings, of the existence of mirror neurons in humans.​[4]​ However, an advantage is that, whereas mirror neuron studies on monkeys have been limited to motor areas of the brain, fMRI scans on the whole of the human brain reveal multiple mirror neuron systems, e.g., action, emotion (Adolphs, et al., 1994; Wicker, et al., 2003), touch (Keysers and Perrett, 2004) and pain (Singer, et al., 2004) mirror neuron systems.​[5]​ Here I shall focus on the action mirror neuron system, which is roughly the same in monkeys and humans.
The action mirror neuron system consists of areas F5 and PF in the monkey brain and the premotor cortex and parts of the posterior parietal cortex in the human brain, specifically, the rostral part of the inferior parietal lobule and the lower part of the precentral gyrus plus the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus. In both monkeys and humans, these areas are involved in sensory guidance of movement and the production of planned movements. Scientists have discovered two kinds of mirror neurons in these areas: strictly congruent and broadly congruent mirror neurons. Strictly congruent mirror neurons fire for the execution or observation of particular narrowly construed behaviors. For example, a group of strictly congruent mirror neurons will fire only when a monkey observes or executes a pincer grasp to pick up, say, a peanut. These same neurons will not fire when the monkey executes or observes a full-hand grasp. Other groups of strictly congruent mirror neurons fire only for full-hand grasps. Broadly congruent mirror neurons, in contrast, fire for the same action less narrowly construed. For example, a particular group of broadly congruent mirror neurons will fire when the monkey observes or executes both pincer grasps and full-hand grasps. The same group of neurons will fire when the monkey uses its hand to pick up a peanut to eat or when it observes another monkey use its foot to pick up a peanut to eat. Broadly congruent mirror neurons are both visuo-motor, as the previous examples show, and audio-motor. If a monkey hears, e.g., peanuts being eaten, mirror neurons that correspond to mouth-related actions will fire. 
The foregoing discussion highlights several similarities and dissimilarities between strictly and broadly congruent mirror neurons in the action mirror neuron system. Both strictly and broadly congruent mirror neurons activate for narrow slices of observed or executed actions. Both strictly and broadly congruent mirror neurons are organized somatotopically. Certain areas activate for mouth-related actions, other areas for hand-related actions, and still others for foot-related actions. With regard to the differences, these examples demonstrate that unlike the strictly congruent variety, broadly congruent mirror neurons are effector independent. Their activation is not sensitive to the precise means for carrying out the action, as the activation of strictly congruent mirror neurons is. 
A subset of broadly congruent mirror neurons, so-called logically related mirror neurons, has received much attention lately (Csibra, 2007; Iacoboni, et al., 2005; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010). These neurons have all the features of broadly congruent mirror neurons and one interesting additional feature: they fire for the end-state of an action sequence even when the end-state is unobserved. For example, logically related mirror neurons fire for the act of grasping an object or, upon observing another’s grasping motion, they fire for the motor act of eating.  In the first-person case, the neurons fire while executing a certain action, A, but in the third-person case they fire in expectation of B, the probable next behavior in the sequence. Thus, there is an asymmetry between the first- and third-person cases. There has been some controversy about whether to call these neurons mirror neurons because, strictly speaking, they do not mirror (Goldman, 2009; Jacob, 2008). That is, the neural activation in the observer does not mirror the neural activation in the actor because the observer’s neurons fire for the next likely behavior B, whereas these neurons in the actor are firing for motor act A. I think it is acceptable to slightly expand the scope of ‘mirror neuron’ to include these so-called logically related neurons.
The division between strictly and broadly congruent mirror neurons, and the logically related neurons that are a subset of broadly congruent mirror neurons, is a feature of both the monkey and human action mirror neuron systems. In both monkeys and humans, broadly congruent mirror neurons are about twice as numerous as strictly congruent mirror neurons. The human mirror neuron system activates for a wider range of actions than monkey mirror neuron systems. For instance, monkey mirror neuron systems activate only for actions that have a material object as a goal, whereas human mirror neuron systems activate for intransitive actions (non-object directed actions) like miming, communicative gestures, and even meaningless movements (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).​[6]​ 
I have thus far highlighted the similarities between the brain of one who performs a particular action and the brain of one who observes that action. There are, of course, many differences between their brains. For example, the observer’s brain exhibits various inhibitory responses that prevent the observer from actually performing the action, the actor’s brain receives and processes proprioceptive information that the observer’s brain does not, and the neural activity in the actor’s mirror neuron system is stronger than in the observer’s mirror neuron system. Although motor mirror neuron activity may be strong enough to produce covert, unconscious movements, in normal cases the observer does not act exactly as the observed target acts.​[7]​
2. My Account of Mirror Neurons

What is the significance of the action mirror neuron system? In this section, I shall explain what I think the role is for each kind of mirror neuron in the action mirror neuron system and then use a particular study to explicate my view. In section 3, I shall defend my view by arguing against alternative accounts. I shall discuss the relationship between mirror neurons and action understanding. I could focus the discussion on emotions and the various emotion mirror neuron systems, as there are debates in the emotion literature that parallel the debates I shall discuss below (Scarantino, 2010). However, I shall discuss the action mirror neuron systems for two reasons: First, more is known about the action mirror neuron systems of monkeys and humans. Second, most theorists debating mirror neurons discuss the action mirror neuron system, so the majority of the arguments about the cognitive and philosophical importance of mirror neurons are focused on the details of this system.
According to my view, the activation of strictly congruent mirror neurons provides information about the precise details of the observed action (e.g., that it is a whole-handed grasp), which may facilitate action understanding. Broadly congruent mirror neurons provide more general information about the observed action (e.g., that it is an eating-related grasp), which may also facilitate action understanding. Logically related mirror neurons function as predictive mechanism for familiar behaviors (e.g., they fire in expectation of eating), thus providing information about the probable next behavior in a sequence. Each kind of mirror neuron provides different information, and that information may in some cases be partially causally related to action understanding. However, in none of these cases, individually or collectively, is the mirror neuron activation constitutive of, necessary, or sufficient for action understanding.
Goldman (2009a, 2009b) usefully distinguishes between constitutive and causal interpretations of mirror neurons’ role in social cognition. In this paper, I shall expand upon Goldman’s distinction between constitutive and causal interpretations. I understand the constitution relation as analogous to the realization relation. To say that neural phenomenon A constitutes cognitive phenomenon B is like saying that C-fiber firing realizes pain. If event A constitutes event B, then, at a minimum, A is metaphysically sufficient for B. The constitution relation stands in contrast to the causal relation. To say that event A causes event B is to say that A brings about B. There are three varieties of causal relations, which unfortunately are rarely distinguished in the literature on mirror neurons (Spaulding, forthcoming): necessary cause, i.e., A is necessary to bring about B; sufficient cause, i.e., A is sufficient to bring about B; and contributory cause, i.e., A is neither necessary nor sufficient to bring about B, but nevertheless it contributes to bringing about B. On my view, mirror neurons are at best contributory causes of action understanding.
2.1 Mirror Neurons and Intention Understanding 
Actions, according to standard philosophical wisdom, are in some way conceptually tied to intentions. An action is something an agent intentionally does.​[8]​ So, to recognize that some behavior (hand movement) is an action (waving hello), one must understand the intention with which the agent acts (to greet you). An intention is standardly regarded as a mental state (Davidson, 2001/1980; Grice, 1972; Searle, 1983). As such, intentions are something distinct from the behavioral sequence and are not directly detectable from the behavioral sequence. I endorse the view that intentions are mental states and that explaining intentional action involves attributing some sort of mental state.​[9]​ 
Strictly and broadly congruent mirror neurons fire in response to particular details (that it is a whole-handed grasp, or that it is an eating-related grasp) about a behavior, but there is a metaphysical and epistemological gap between this mirror neuron activation and the mental state attribution required for action understanding. On my view, the activation of broadly and strictly congruent mirror neurons is like yawning in response to observing another’s yawn. My yawning reflex does not constitute understanding or in any way imply that I understand that you are bored. Understanding that you are bored requires recognizing that you are in a particular mental state, and my yawning response does not constitute that recognition. 
Likewise, the automatic resonance of my mirror neurons does not constitute recognizing your mental states. Broadly and strictly congruent mirror neuron activation in an observer entails nothing about whether the observer attributes an intentional mental state to the actor. The same is true for logically related mirror neurons. Neural firing in expectation of an event in a behavioral sequence does not constitute understanding another’s mental states. These different kinds of mirror neuron activity may all be partially causally related to action understanding, with each kind of mirror neuron providing different kinds of information about the observed behavior, but none of the kinds of mirror neuron activity, individually or collectively, constitute action understanding. Analogously, my yawning in response to your yawn may play a role in my inference that you are bored, but the yawning plays a metaphysically and epistemologically indirect role. 
Moreover, no kind of mirror neuron activity is necessary for bringing about genuine intention understanding. It is not necessary because we can infer an intention without mirror neuron firing.  For example, suppose I tell you that Johnny went to the store and bought graham crackers, chocolate and marshmallows.  From this you infer that Johnny intends to make s’mores. Although I have not done any brain scanning to test whether your mirror neurons would be activated in this scenario, I find it unlikely that they would be. What exactly would the mirror neurons mirror?  The typical motor mirror neuron activations are for hand, foot and mouth movements, but none of that information plays a role in the story I describe, and yet you are still able to infer the intention.  
Furthermore, mirroring is not a sufficient cause of intention understanding. Automatic neural resonance and anticipatory neural activation do not suffice for intention understanding. The automatic motor resonance, which I likened to yawning in response to observing a yawn, is not sufficient for understanding an intention, a mental representation. And neural firing in expectation of an event in a behavioral sequence is not sufficient for understanding an intentional mental state, either.
2.2 Mirror Neurons and Goal Understanding
Mirror neuron activity, on my view, is more closely related to understanding goal-directed behavior than intentional actions. Understanding a target’s goal-directed behavior amounts to understanding the target’s orientation toward some thing in the world, which requires various motor and sensory representations. In contrast, actions transcend mere behaviors. An action is something an agent does intentionally. Understanding a target’s actions requires not only understanding the target’s orientation toward some thing, state or event, but also understanding how the target represents her orientation toward that thing, state or event. That is, understanding an action requires understanding the target’s mental representations (Davidson, 1980/2001; Searle, 1983). It is standard in philosophy to distinguish goal-directed behavior, the understanding of which requires motor and sensory representations, and action, the understanding of which additionally requires mental representations. 
My insistence on making this distinction between goal-directed behaviors and actions may seem like a mere terminological squabble, but this is not the case. I do not care what we call these two categories so long as we keep them distinct. I am at pains to distinguish the two categories now because, as will become clear in the next section, in the discussion of the cognitive importance of mirror neurons this distinction is often neglected. If mirror neuron activity constituted action understanding in the full philosophical sense of the term, then mirror neuron activity would constitute intention understanding, and this would have important implications for a very broad range of social cognitive abilities. But if mirror neurons simply aid in detecting goal-directed behavior, then the relationship between mirror neurons and intention understanding is less direct and less clear, and the relationship between mirror neurons and more sophisticated theory of mind abilities is even more tenuous. I shall argue that, contrary to the many bold claims about mirror neurons and social cognition, the latter claim is true.
On my view, mirror neurons are more closely related to goal understanding than intention understanding. However, mirror neurons are still only tenuously related to goal understanding. Mirror neurons do not constitute, and are neither necessary nor sufficient for, understanding goal-directed behavior. Mirror neurons may be causally relevant to goal understanding. Importantly, though, they are not the only relevant areas of the brain for understanding goal-directed behavior, which undermines the idea that mirror neuron activation constitutes or is causally sufficient for goal understanding. In addition to mirror neurons, neurons in superior temporal sulcus (STS), canonical neurons, and non-motor perceptual cues play key roles in understanding goal-directed behavior. 
Neurons in the STS have the same perceptual properties as mirror neurons but lack first-person motor properties. In other words, these neurons fire only when observing the target’s goal-directed behavior, never simply when the subject acts. The STS is an area where others’ behaviors are visually processed and has long been recognized as part of the neural circuitry underlying the perception of others’ behaviors (Gazzaniga, 2009, p. 549). 
Canonical neurons are the inverse of STS neurons; they have the same motor properties as mirror neurons but differ in their perceptual properties. These neurons fire when the subject grasps objects and when the subject sees a graspable object, but not when a target grasps an object. Canonical neurons are thought to process, in the first-person case, one’s own motor movements toward an object and, in the third-person case, the potential for behavior directed toward the observed object (Gazzaniga, 2009, p. 550). 
Non-motor perceptual cues are also relevant to understanding goal-directed behavior. In an influential study on mirror neurons, researchers found that mirror neurons in monkeys preferentially responded to grasping-to-eat over grasping-to-place behaviors even when these behaviors were motorically very similar (Fogassi, et al., 2005). For our purpose, the important feature of this study is that two factors helped the monkeys discriminate between grasping for eating and grasping for placing: whether the object grasped is food and whether a container is present in the context of the perceived action (Jacob, 2008). Both of these factors are purely perceptual cues. Importantly, purely perceptual cues do not themselves cause mirror neuron activity. If shown a picture of a container and a piece of food, one’s mirror neurons would not fire. Only observing or performing motor acts causes mirror neuron activity. And yet perceptual cues are relevant factors in recognizing that some movement is a goal-directed behavior. My hypothesis is that perceptual cues modulate mirror neuron responses. That is, when observing some movement, perceptual cues aid in determining whether the movement is a goal-directed behavior. Thus, even if we narrow our focus from actions to goal-directed behavior, mirror neurons are still only a limited part of the story. Non-motor perceptual cues and STS and canonical neurons are proof that mirror neuron activity does not constitute, nor is it sufficient to bring about, understanding goal-directed behavior.
On my account, mirror neurons causally contribute to understanding goal-directed behaviors. In other words, mirror neurons are neither necessary nor sufficient to bring about goal understanding, yet they still causally contribute to understanding goal-directed behavior. Although mirror neuron activity may in fact be a mechanism that contributes to our ability to understand goal-directed behavior, there is little evidence that mirror neurons are nomologically necessary for understanding goal-directed behavior. 
Two studies may seem to present counterexamples to my claim that mirror neurons are not necessary for goal-directed behavior understanding.​[10]​ First, Pobric and Hamilton (2006) argue that TMS data indicate that the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) is necessary for accurate action understanding. The authors report that performance in judging the weight of a lifted box was impaired during stimulation of left IFG relative to all other conditions, and they take this to be direct evidence in support of the hypothesis that mirror neurons are necessary for action understanding. (“Action” is used ambiguously with respect to the action/goal-directed behavior distinction I made above.) However, the data do not support this conclusion. TMS on the IFG produced deficits in judging the weight of a box, but judging the weight of a box is distinct task from understanding an action or goal-directed behavior. The results of the study are compatible with my contributory cause account of mirror neurons. 
Second, Pazzaglia, et al. (2008) report data indicating that apraxic subjects with damage to mirror neuron areas of the brain were more impaired than nonapraxic subjects in action execution and in judging the correct execution of an observed action. (Again, “action” is used ambiguously.) They found significant positive correlation between deficits in gesture production and deficits in gesture comprehension. Though this may seem like prima facie evidence that mirror neuron activation is necessary for understanding goal-directed behavior, the authors argue that the complete story is much more complicated. As the authors themselves note, the complex nature of gesture understanding belies the simplistic inference from a single lesional locus to gesture recognition deficit. The results of this study are also compatible with my view that mirror neurons causally contribute to understanding goal-directed behaviors.

2.3 Evidence for My Account
Empirical evidence supports my hypothesis about the relation between mirror neuron firing and action understanding. First, mirror neurons are sensitive to the mode of presentation of actions. For example, monkeys’ mirror neurons do not fire when watching a familiar behavior on a video monitor (Ferrari et al., 2003; Keysers and Perrett, 2004) despite the fact that there is evidence that monkeys understand behaviors displayed on monitors.​[11]​ This casts doubt on the claim that mirror neurons constitute or directly cause action understanding (Jellema et al., 2000).​[12]​
Second, humans’ mirror neuron activity is insensitive to the difficulty of interpreting an action. Brass, et al. (2007) hypothesize that our remarkable capacity to flexibly interpret observed behaviors as intentional actions is mediated not by the mirror neuron system, but an inferential interpretive system located in the STS and anterior frontomedian cortex (aFMC), areas independently associated with perception of social stimuli, mentalizing, and action understanding. This study tests that hypothesis by having subjects, while in an fMRI machine, watch three short videos in which an actor operates a light switch with her knee. The three videos demonstrate the actor operating a light switch with her knee in a plausible context (both of the actor’s hands are fully occupied), implausible context (actor uses two hands to hold a small, lightweight item), and no context (actor’s hands are unoccupied). The subjects are required to come up with a rationale for each case. 
Experimenters found that activation in the STS and aFMC activated to a level corresponding to the difficulty in ascribing a rationale to the actor. In other words, attributing an intention to the actor in the plausible context elicited the lowest activation of the STS and aFMC, and attributing an intention to the actor in the no-context scene elicited the highest activation of the STS and aFMC. The more difficult it is to ascribe an intention to the actor, the more strongly these areas activate. Subjects’ mirror neuron activity, in contrast, activated indiscriminately of context. That is, mirror neuron activation was the same for the plausible-context scene (the actor’s hands are fully occupied) and the no-context scene (the actor’s hands are unoccupied). Mirror neuron activity does not differentiate between harder-to-interpret actions and easy-to-interpret actions. This undermines the idea that mirror neurons constitute or directly cause genuine action understanding. This study indicates that genuine intentional action understanding is mediated by the STS and aFMC, an inferential interpretive system. 
2.4 The Tea Party Experiment
Let’s look at a particular study to see how my account explains the results.  This example is from a foundational study on motor mirror neurons in humans referred to as the Tea Party experiment (Iacoboni, et al., 2005). Subjects observe the following scenes: context, action, and intention. The context scene contains only objects, e.g., a teapot, a cup, a plate with cookies.  There are two kinds of context scenes.  In one context scene, the objects are arranged neatly, suggesting that someone is going to have tea.  In the other context scene are crumbs, a dirty napkin, and a tipped-over cup, suggesting that someone has already had tea.  In the action scene, subjects observe a hand grasping a cup without any contextual cues.  The intention scene combines the context and action scenes, and subjects observe a hand grasping a cup in the neat or messy context.​[13]​  
The researchers found higher activation in mirror neuron areas while subjects observed the intention scene embedded in the clean and dirty contexts, compared to observing the action scene.  They also found higher activity in mirror neuron areas while subjects observed the intention scene with the context that suggested drinking, compared to the context that suggested cleaning up. In addition, half of the participants in this study were instructed to pay attention to the intention displayed by the behavior they were observing, while the other half were not told anything about intentions.  The researchers found no difference in mirror neuron activation between the participants in each group, but in the debriefing session all participants were able to accurately report the intentions associated with each version of the intention scene.
What should we make of the data from the Tea Party experiment? There is some mirror neuron activity in subjects observing the action scene, but there is higher activity when they are observing the intention scene, especially the neat version of the intention scene. On my view, the mirror neuron activity in the action scene is due to the activation of strictly and broadly congruent mirror neurons, which motorically resonate in response to the observed features of the behavior, providing particular bits of information about the observed behaviors. 
The increased activity during the intention scene is due to the additional activation of logically related mirror neurons, which function as an anticipatory or predictive mechanism. It has been shown that mirror neurons activate more strongly when observing familiar behaviors (Calvo-Merino, et al., 2006). When a subject observes a familiar behavioral sequence, his logically related mirror neurons fire in expectation of a certain behavioral event. In the experiment, logically related mirror neurons do not activate for the context scene because there is no goal-directed behavior to predict. The context scene contains only objects. Logically related mirror neurons do not activate for the action scene because, again, there is nothing to predict. The action scene shows a hand grasping a cup, and there is no information that indicates any goal beyond grasping the cup. The increased activation of logically related mirror neurons for the intention scene indicates an expectation of further unobserved behavior, drinking (in the neat version) or cleaning, perhaps (in the messy version).​[14]​ This mirror neuron activity, in conjunction with the perceptual cues (e.g., crumbs and dirty napkins), neurons in the STS and canonical neurons, cause one to recognize, and anticipate the completion of, a goal-directed behavior. This expectation or prediction may sometimes be involved with intention understanding in the sense that it may provide information relevant in inferring intentions, but it is indirectly related to intention understanding. 
Finally, what should we make of the post-experiment debriefing about the intentions associated with the neat and messy versions of the intention scene? In light of the Brass, et al. study explained above, I think we have pretty good evidence that mirror neuron activation does not reflect the understanding of intentions associated with each scene. I will discuss this fully in the next section. For now, I shall just say that I think the post-experiment debriefing is uninformative with regard to the neural correlates of intention understanding. There are several possible explanations of this feature of the Tea Party experiment, and the hypothesis that this feature proves that mirror neuron activity constitutes intention understanding is plausible only if you already believe that mirror neurons underlie intention understanding.




The Parma group, the group of Italian neuroscientists who discovered mirror neurons, offers the most notable robust interpretation of mirror neurons. The Parma group holds that, “The activation of the [mirror neuron system] is intrinsically constitutive of action and intention understanding, at least at the level of basic actions” (Gallese, et al., 2009, p. 108). Vittorio Gallese, a member of the Parma group, offers the most well developed account of how mirror neuron mechanisms underlie social cognition. According to the Parma group’s account, when a subject observes a target’s actions, the activation of the subject’s mirror neurons realizes a direct, experiential understanding of the target’s intentions. (Gallese, et al., 2009, p. 110). In Gallese’s terminology, mirror neuron activity realizes intentional attunement, a direct form of understanding others from within.
 Let’s look at how the Parma group explains the results of the Tea Party experiment. They hypothesize that if mirror neurons are sensitive only to the visual properties of the observed grasping action, activity in the mirror neuron areas should be equivalent while observing the action and intention scenes because the movement of the hand is the same in both scenes. If mirror neurons code the intentions associated with the observed action, thus predicting the actions that would follow the observed one, activity in the mirror neuron areas should be different between the action and intention scenes (Iacoboni, et al., 2005; Iacoboni, 2009). And indeed there is higher activation for the intention scene than the action scene. The higher activation in the intention scene is due to the activation of logically related mirror neurons. The Parma group takes this as evidence that logically related mirror neurons code the intentions associated with observed actions. “Logically related mirror neurons are likely key neuronal elements for understanding the intentions associated with the observed action” (Iacoboni, 2009, 131).
The Parma group also draws on the debriefing session as further evidence for their conclusion.  There was identical mirror neuron activity for subjects who were instructed to understand the intention in each scene and for subjects who were not so instructed.  The fact that subjects from both groups were able to report the intention associated with each scene and the fact that their mirror neuron activity was identical suggests that we associate intentions with actions automatically via the activation of mirror neurons (Iacoboni, et al., 2005).
Thus, according to this robust interpretation of mirror neurons, the subject’s mirror neuron activity constitutes an understanding of the target’s intention. I posed two questions at the beginning of this paper: What sort of understanding is involved with mirror neuron activity, and how is mirror neuron activity related to that understanding? With respect to the question 1, the Parma group holds that mirror neuron activity involves intention understanding. This intention understanding is experiential in the sense that the observer undergoes the same kind of mirror neuron firing that the target’s brain undergoes when enacting his intentions.  On this hypothesis, the kind of understanding involved is non-conceptual – it is similar to non-epistemic, or non-doxastic, perception. 
With respect to question 2, the Parma group argues that mirroring constitutes intention understanding. Mirroring afforded understanding of others’ intentions is metaphysically and epistemologically direct in the sense that it requires no inference from observed behavior to intention. The mirror neuron activity is sufficient for intention understanding. In the same way that C-fibers firing constitutes or realizes pain, mirroring constitutes intention understanding. In contrast, my position is that mirror neuron activity, in conjunction with other non-mirror neuron mechanisms, causally contributes to understanding goal-directed behavior. Thus, my account differs from the Parma group’s with regard to both questions posed above. 
3.1 Failed Critiques
I think the Parma group’s account is incorrect, and I shall defend my view by arguing against the Parma group’s robust interpretation of mirror neurons. But first I shall discuss a couple of objections to the Parma group’s account that miss the mark. Although I am sympathetic to these objections, they do not suffice to refute the Parma group’s account because they fail to appreciate some of the subtler aspects of the account. 
The first objection stems from the distinction between “motor intentions” (or what I call “goals” in my terminology) and “social intentions” (what I simply call “intentions”) (Csibra, 2005, 2007; Goldman, 2009a; Jacob and Jeannerod, 2005).  The same immediate goal is compatible with a number of intentions (e.g., one could be turning on a light in order to see better or to scare away an intruder) and the same intention is compatible with a number of different immediate goals (e.g., one could act on the intention to scare away an intruder by turning on a light, making a loud noise, or calling the police). The seemingly obvious problem with the Parma group’s robust interpretation is that even if mirror neurons could constitute an understanding of immediate goals of actions (e.g., turning on a light), there seems to be a gap between the immediate goals and intentions.  There is no direct link between goals and intentions.​[15]​  So even if mirroring could constitute an understanding of goals, it is difficult to see how mirroring could underlie an understanding of intentions, and thus it is hard to see how mirroring could underlie social cognition, which is much broader and more sophisticated than mere immediate-goal understanding. 
This objection argues that mirroring does not constitute intention understanding.  It leaves open the issue of whether and how mirror neurons are involved in detecting the goals of behavior. The second objection addresses the relationship between mirroring and goal understanding.  What is this relationship?  The data on mirror neurons are consistent with three different hypotheses.  One hypothesis is that the firing of mirror neurons constitutes a direct, experiential understanding of others’ goals. A second hypothesis is that mirror neuron activity causes goal understanding. A third hypothesis is that the firing of mirror neurons neither constitutes nor causes goal understanding but is subsequent to processes that produce goal understanding. That is, mirror neurons activate because the organism has already understood an action (Csibra, 2005, 2007; Jacob, 2008). What, then, is the cognitive function of mirror neurons? On this view, other neural areas are responsible for the recognition that some movement is a goal-directed behavior and activation in these other neural areas serve as input to mirror neurons. This explains why mirror neurons activate only for goal-directed behaviors. Mirror neurons function as a predictive mechanism that anticipates goal-oriented behavior beyond what is observed. The second objection is based on this third hypothesis. This objection argues that, contrary to the Parma group’s claims about intention understanding, the function of mirror neurons is to predict, or anticipate, further behavior.  
Most critics of robust interpretations of mirror neurons make two kinds of distinctions: between social intentions and motor intentions (the basis of the first objection) and between intention understanding and prediction (the basis of the second objection).  Despite the prevalence of such objections, as they stand both objections fail because they fail to appreciate nuanced aspects of the Parma group’s account. 
With regard to the first distinction, critics argue that the mirror neuron activity may be involved in understanding behavioral goals, but it cannot constitute intention understanding. To argue this way misunderstands the Parma group’s account. Their account is meant to challenge the idea that there is a sharp divide between behavioral understanding of goals and mentalistic understanding of intentions. It is meant to challenge the view that goal attribution requires merely motor and sensory representation whereas intention attribution requires mental attribution. Gallese says, “We should ask ourselves the following question: what does it mean to determine the intention of the action of someone else? I propose a deflationary answer. Determining why a given act (e.g. grasping a cup) was executed can be equivalent to detecting the goal of the still not executed and impending subsequent act (e.g., bringing the cup to the mouth)” (2007, p. 662). The Parma group account challenges the claim that social cognition requires the observer to attribute a mental state to the target, and in this sense offers a deflationary account of social cognition. Thus, in order for the goal vs. intention objection to succeed one has to do more than assert the distinction, which is all that most critics of the Parma group do. One must argue for the distinction between behavioral goals and mentalistic intentions.
With regard to the second distinction, critics argue that mirror neuron firing is involved in behavioral prediction and so not involved in intention understanding.  However, the Parma group argues that behavioral prediction and intention understanding are inextricably related.  On their view, ascribing intentions and predicting goals occur by default (at least for simple actions) and are the product of mirror neuron firing.  As Gallese puts it, “Ascribing intention would therefore consist in predicting a forthcoming new goal.  According to this perspective, action prediction and the ascription of intentions are related phenomena, underpinned by the same functional mechanism, i.e. embodied simulation” (2007, p. 662).  Thus, even if the critics are right that (certain kinds of) mirror neurons function as a predictive mechanism, this by itself does not cast doubt on the Parma group’s claim that mirror neuron firing constitutes action understanding because on the Parma group’s account prediction and intention attribution go hand-in-hand.  As with the earlier objection, for the prediction vs. intention understanding objection to succeed against embodied simulation, one must do more than assert the distinction. 
In sum, both sorts of objections fail to refute the robust interpretation of mirror neurons because they fail to appreciate the subtleties of the Parma group’s account. In the next section, I shall discuss my own objections to the Parma group’s interpretation of mirror neuron activity while making the case for my own interpretation of the cognitive importance of mirror neurons. My arguments offer further support to critics of the robust interpretation of mirror neurons.
3.2 My Critique
My argument against the Parma group’s account will come in two parts. First, I shall argue that there is no good empirical evidence for deflationary account of intention. In fact, some empirical data are hard to reconcile with the deflationary account. Second, I shall argue that there are good philosophical reasons to reject the deflationary account and accept the distinction between goals and intentions. Divorcing goals from intentions dismantles the Parma group’s account of the role of mirror neurons in social cognition.
In order to argue against the Parma group’s account of mirror neurons I need briefly to explain the argument for their account. Here is a sketch of the argument for the deflationary account of intention (Gallese, 2007, p. 659; 2009a, pp. 164-165). First, there is good evidence that infants as young as 15 months can understand false beliefs, which implies that they can understand intentions (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005).  But 15-month-old infants do not have language or other sophisticated mentalizing abilities. This shows that even apparently highly sophisticated mentalizing skills – like the attribution of false beliefs to others – might still be underpinned by low-level mechanisms (Gallese, 2009b, p. 528). 
Second, macaque monkeys understand intentional actions.  We know this, according to the Parma group, because the monkeys’ mirror neurons track intentions. We know their mirror neurons are not simply responding to the mere visual features of the scenes because their mirror neurons fire while observing intentional actions but not kinesthetically identical miming movements (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004).  Thus, the argument goes, 15-month-olds and Macaques understand intentions, but they are not cognitively sophisticated enough to be attributing mental states, so intention understanding must require less cognitive sophistication than mainstream cognitive science supposes.
In addition to the results of the Tea Party experiment, these data allegedly put stress on the standard account of intention understanding, which distinguishes goal understanding from intention understanding. The Parma group offers an alternative account of intention that purports to explain these data in a unified way. On their account, intention understanding just is behavioral prediction. Monkeys and human infants are capable of understanding others’ intentions, as experiments from developmental psychology and neuroscience demonstrate, but according to the Parma group intention understanding does not consist in representing the mental state of the observed target. This is far too sophisticated. Rather, intention understanding consists in predicting a forthcoming goal of the observed behavior. This prediction is realized by mirror neurons, in particular, logically related mirror neurons. 
I am skeptical of this argument. I do not think any of these sources of evidence put stress on the standard account of intention understanding. The first problem is that it is unclear what to make of the data from developmental psychology. In the social cognition literature the response to these studies has been split between two contrary views (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009). There are those who think these studies show that even 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs, and perhaps already possess the belief concept (Baillargeon, 2010; Leslie, 2004; Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005). On the opposite side are those who think that these studies show that infants must be very clever behavior-readers because it is not possible for 15-month-olds to understand false beliefs, or possess the belief concept (Perner and Ruffman, 2005). Elsewhere I have argued for two systems account of social cognition that mitigates this dispute (Spaulding, 2011). Without delving too far into this debate, the point to make here is that it is a highly contentious matter whether or not these data support the conclusion that infants understand false beliefs. 
The second element in the argument for the deflationary account of intention involves mirror neuron studies on monkeys. Studies show that monkeys’ mirror neurons do not respond to miming behavior. This is perfectly explicable on my account of mirror neurons. Monkeys’ mirror neurons are sensitive to goal-directed behavior, and for monkeys miming is not a goal-directed behavior. (It is for humans, because we recognize miming as a kind of communication.) In the miming case, there is no material object to grasp, play with, or eat. There are no perceptual cues to indicate goal-directed behavior. We do not need the Parma group’s deflationary account of intention to explain these data. 
The final element of the argument for the deflationary account of intention involves the Tea Party experiment. The results of this experiment do not support the deflationary account of intention. In the second section of this paper I gave my account of the results of the Tea Party experiment. I argued that mirror neurons are partially causally related to understanding of goal-directed behavior. Moreover, the post-experiment debriefing, which the Parma group takes to be definitive proof that mirror neurons underlie intention understanding, lends little support their account. 
There are a number of hypotheses that could explain why there was no difference between the two groups with regard to mirror neuron activation and ability to accurately report intentions. One alternative hypothesis is that we associate intentions with actions automatically, but mirror neurons have nothing to do with this. If that were the case, it would explain why both groups would display similar mirror neuron activity and why both groups were equally able to report the intentions associated with each scene. Another hypothesis is that the members of the group that was instructed to pay attention to the intention detected the intention during the observation whereas the members of the other group retrodicted the intention during the debriefing session, but there is no difference between the two groups’ mirror neuron activations because mirror neurons are unrelated to intention detection. This hypothesis also explains these results. 
The debriefing part of the Tea Party experiment does not exclude these alternative hypotheses because in comparing the two different groups, the experimenters specifically compared activity in mirror neuron areas. The tacit assumption is that if both groups could report the intention and both groups had similar mirror neuron activity, then mirror neuron activity underlies intention understanding. This though this is an invalid inference. And in fact, the Brass, et al. (2007) study discussed above indicates that mirror neuron areas do not mediate intention attribution for they are insensitive to differing degrees of difficulty in attributing intentions to others. Thus, contrary to the Parma group’s claims and Alvin Goldman’s claims on their behalf (Goldman, 2009b, p. 242), the post-experiment debriefing lends no credence to the Parma group’s hypotheses. 
In fact, I think we can give a more unified picture of the empirical evidence by distinguishing between goals and intentions as I did in section 2. Without such a distinction it is hard even to make sense of all of the data, e.g., the fact that mirror neuron activation is insensitive to differing degrees of difficulty in intention attribution (Brass, et al., 2007), the fact that mirror neurons fire only for familiar behaviors (Calvo-Merino, et al., 2006), and the fact monkeys’ mirror neurons fail to fire when observing familiar behaviors on a video monitor (Ferrari, et al, 2003). If mirror neurons constituted intention understanding these results would be utterly strange. But if we distinguish between goals and intentions and regard mirror neurons as causal contributors to goal understanding, then all of these data are perfectly explicable.
The empirical evidence the Parma group cites does not support the deflationary account of intention even for the relatively basic actions discussed above. Perhaps there is good theoretical support for the deflationary account of intention, though. The Parma group’s concept of intention is interestingly similar to a philosophical account of intention within action theory. The neuroscientists could align themselves with a faction of action theorists who argue that intentions are not mental states. 
According to the so-called naive action theory, intending an action is a form of being in progress toward that action (Moran and Stone, 2008; Thompson, 2008). For example, suppose that Michael intends to be making an omelet. We explain Michael’s action by referring to what he is in the process of doing. Michael is breaking eggs because he is (in the process of) making an omelet. The analysis of Michael’s action need not involve reference to his mental states. In fact, all the analysis requires is an explanation of what Michael is doing and what goal his behavior serves. To attribute to Michael the intention to make an omelet is to claim that what he is presently doing, breaking eggs, is being done in order to make an omelet. Indeed, in breaking eggs Michael is making an omelet because breaking eggs is part of the process of making an omelet. Thus, understanding an intentional action is just a matter of perceiving the goal-directedness of what is currently happening and predicting the next phase of the action. Naïve action theory holds that all action explanations can be formulated naïvely, i.e., without reference to psychological states like wanting and intending. Naïve action explanations are fundamental, whereas “sophisticated” action explanations are never necessary and are unlikely to be the fundamental form of action explanation (Thompson, 2008). 
The naïve action theory stands in contrast to the standard action theory view, which holds that an intention is a mental state – perhaps a belief or pro-attitude of some sort (Davidson, 1980/2001; Grice, 1972; Searle, 1983). The standard view maintains that explaining a target’s intentional action requires reference to the belief or pro-attitude that causes and guides the action, whereas naïve action theory – like the Parma group’s deflationary account – denies this.​[16]​ The potential alliance between the Parma group and naïve action theory would be mutually beneficial. The Parma group could garner much needed philosophical support for their account of intention by endorsing naïve action theory’s general account of intention, and the naive action theory could find empirical support in the Parma group’s account of mirror neurons.
Although this proposed alignment with naïve action theory would provide some philosophical support for the Parma group’s deflationary account of intention, it would not help establish their claims about mirror neurons. The view that mirror neuron activation constitutes intention understanding even in this deflationary sense is subject to my previous arguments regarding the relationship between mirror neurons and goal understanding. The deflationary account of intention amounts to what I call goals. I argued above that mirror neurons are, at best, causal contributors to goal understanding. They are neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding goal-directed behavior. This means that regardless of whether or not the deflationary account of intention is right, mirror neurons would at most causally contribute to deflationary-intention understanding. Such a conclusion is compatible with my own view of the role of mirror neurons in social cognition but incompatible with the Parma group’s claim that mirror neuron activation constitutes deflationary-intention understanding. Thus, even if they are right about the deflationary account of intention, they are wrong about the relationship between mirror neurons and understanding intentions. That is, they are wrong about question 2 posed above.
I think the Parma group also is wrong about question 1, the kind of understanding involved with mirror neurons. For even if naïve action theory turns out to be true, that is, even if intention is not a mental state but rather a form of being in progress toward some goal, intention is of course associated with mental states. For example, intentionally making an omelet may imply that you desire to make an omelet and/or believe that you are making an omelet. This is important because the fundamental question for my purpose is how we understand others’ intentions. Simply observing a target’s behavior does not make transparent his intention. The occurrence of behavior directed toward A is neither necessary nor sufficient for intending to A. 
Two sorts of cases illustrate help this claim. First, one can intend to do some action A without ever doing A (or taking any observable steps toward doing A). For example, I could intend to call my dad on his birthday but then forget and not call him. Second, one can purposefully do B, which necessarily entails A, without intending to do A. For example, I could purposefully buy a book about Mark Twain, thereby buying a book about Samuel Clemens, without intending to buy a book about Samuel Clemens. In order for an observer to correctly identify a target’s behavior as intending to A – as being in progress toward A – the observer must advert to some aspect of the agent’s thought.
The first case challenges the idea that the occurrence of behavior directed toward goal A is necessary for intending A, and the second case challenges the idea that the occurrence of behavior directed toward A is sufficient for intending A. One could deny these observations and say that in the first case I planned to intend to call my dad on his birthday, or that I never really intended to call my dad on birthday (even though I thought I did). Or one could claim that I am already engaged in the action of calling my dad, just in virtue of planning it, intending nothing incompatible with it, reasoning about the means, etc. In this case, I am in the process of doing something that I will fail to complete. For the second example, one could say that I intended to buy a book about Samuel Clemens, despite my beliefs and desires. I do not find these explanations particularly compelling, especially given that the standard account of intention gives straightforward explanations of these cases.
On the standard account, the explanation for the first observation is that my intention to call my dad is a sort of belief, action-guiding pro-attitude, or plan that I inadvertently forgot. In the second case, I have some sort of belief, action-guiding pro-attitude, or plan the content of which is buy book about Mark Twain. Like other mental states, intentions pick out things under a certain description. Although Mark Twain is the same person as Samuel Clemens, my intention is to buy a book about Mark Twain, not Samuel Clemens. If we think of intentions as mental states, which are conceptually distinct from goals, then we can straightforwardly explain the above observations. In this way, the distinction between goals and intentions earns its philosophical keep. 
Certainly there are possible (and actual) refinements of the simplistic deflationary account of intention I am criticizing. But the relevant point here is that for the purpose of social cognition we need to appeal to some aspect of the agent’s mental life in order to understand her intention, which makes the Parma group’s deflationary account of intention inadequate for social cognition. Plausibly, we identify a target’s intention by knowing some of the mental states associated with the behavior. In other words, even if intention is a form of doing, the process of understanding a target’s intention involves attributing various mental states to the target. Thus, regardless of the outcome of this action theory debate, attributing an intention to a target requires some sort of mental state attribution. 
I do think there is a legitimate distinction between goals and intentions, but we can settle for a distinction between goal attribution and intention attribution. Goal attribution requires attributing sensory and motor representations, whereas intention attribution additionally requires mental state attribution. This is a philosophically well-grounded distinction that even naïve action theorists ought to accept. With regard to the mirror neuron debate, this entails that mirror neuron activation is more closely aligned with goal attribution than intention attribution. Mirror neurons causally contribute to understanding goal-directed behavior by causing the subject to share (some of) the motor and sensory representations that the target has with respect to the goal-directed behavior. This, of course, is neither necessary nor sufficient for a goal attribution. Nevertheless, shared sensorimotor representations, in addition to semantic and visual representations of an observed behavior, causally contribute to goal attribution. Mirror neurons are at best causal contributors to goal attribution. Thus, the Parma group is mistaken about question 1 as well.
The first objection critics make about the Parma group involves the distinction between goals and intentions. Simply asserting the standard distinction, as most critics do, begs the question against the Parma group whose members explicitly argue for a non-standard account of intention. In order to make this objection stick, one must defend the distinction and argue that it is empirically and philosophically more credible than Parma group’s account, which I have done. 




This paper advances the debate about the significance of mirror neurons in social cognition in a number of ways. First, it carefully distinguishes two often-conflated issues about the relationship between mirror neurons and social cognition (the kind of understanding involved with mirror neurons and how mirror neurons are related to that understanding), and it evaluates the possible answers one might give to these questions. Second, it explains why most of the current arguments against the Parma group miss the mark. Third, it advances an empirically and philosophically plausible account of the role of mirror neurons in social cognition.
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^1	  This is a technique in which the scientists cut into the brain and place electrodes in the brain to record the activity of individual neurons.
^2	  fMRI is a non-invasive method of brain mapping. fMRI scans track neuronal activity by tracking changes in blood flow to specific areas of the brain. The brain supplies energy to neurons through blood flow. When neurons fire, they require a quick increase in energy, which is supplied by a rapid increase in blood flow to the neurons. Thus, by detecting changes in blood flow, fMRI scans detect neuronal activity. The correlation is not perfect, however. Sometimes increased blood flow to an area indicates an inhibitory response, other times the scan shows blood flow to areas adjacent to the actual neuronal activity. Moreover, a bit of controversy arose recently over the statistical analyses of fMRI data (Vul, et al., 2009). Despite these flaws, hardly anyone suggests that we should remove fMRI from our toolkit. Instead, we ought to be cautious in theorizing about data drawn exclusively from fMRI. My analysis of mirror neurons will be duly cautious.
^3	  TMS, like fMRI, is a non-invasive method of brain mapping. TMS works by changing magnetic fields surrounding the brain. By inducing weak electric currents in specific areas of the brain, scientists can temporarily knock out, as it were, specific neural areas. Once these neural areas are temporarily paralyzed, scientists run psychological tests to see whether and in what way psychological functions are impaired. This testing allows scientists to localize neural causal factors of psychological functions.
^4	  This has led some theorists to skepticism about the existence of mirror neurons in humans. I think the results on human mirror neuron systems are robust enough now that the lack of single-cell studies should not concern us all that much. In any case, one would have to do a lot of explaining away to make the case that humans do not have mirror neurons. Our closest relatives have this neural mechanism and fMRI scans, which are generally pretty reliable, indicate a similar mechanism in homologous areas in the human brain.
^5	  A terminological debate is afoot concerning whether to regard these so-called emotion, touch and pain mirror neurons as genuine mirror neurons (Jacob, 2008). Some claim that mirror neurons are as a matter of definition motor neurons, and so only neurons in the pre-motor cortex can be mirror neurons. Others define mirror neurons functionally, as neurons that fire in the same way for an endogenously produced state and when observing that same state in others. It is a historical accident that these neurons were discovered first in the pre-motor cortex. I see no good reason to limit the term ‘mirror neuron’ to motor neurons when neurons in the insula and somatosensory cortices display the same sorts of mirroring properties. My use of ‘mirror neuron’ should be understood in the functional sense of term.
^6	  This standard distinction between mirror neuron activation for transitive vs. intransitive actions may be an oversimplification. Kraskov, et al. (2009) studied the mirror properties of 64 neurons in the F5 area of the Macaque brain, and they found that when the monkey observed a transitive action 52% of these neurons were modulated (29% of the neurons exhibited suppression of discharge, and 23% exhibited facilitation of discharge). During the observation of intransitive actions, 29% of these neurons were modulated (12% suppression, 17% facilitation). Thus, in this study 17% of 64 F5 neurons studied exhibited mirroring properties during the observation of intransitive actions. Also, Cisek and Kalaska (2004) report that some neurons in the monkeys’ dorsal premotor cortex activate in response to performance and observation of more abstract actions. These neurons are not mirror neurons, but they share some mirror-like properties.
^7	  Patients with echopraxia involuntarily copy observed movements. Some theorists hypothesize that this disorder, which is common in autistics, is the result of an impairment of the mirror neuron system. I suspect that it has more to do with incapacitated inhibitory responses than mirror neurons per se.
^8	  In the action theory literature, theorists distinguish three senses of intentional action: acting with a certain intention, acting intentionally, and intention-for-the future. There have been various attempts to give a unified account these senses of intentional action (Anscombe, 1957; Davidson, 2001). 
^9	  There is a debate over exactly what kind of mental state an intention is. I shall sidestep this debate here. In endorsing the intention-as-mental-state view, I am rejecting a host of non-standard views, inspired by Anscombe’s account, that understand intention in terms of goal-oriented behavior (Moran and Stone, 2008; Thompson, 2008). These views hold that intending to do A is not a mental state; it is a form of being in progress toward some goal. Thus, on these views explanation of intentional action need not invoke any psychological terms. These non-standard views will come up again later in this paper.
^10	  Thanks to an anonymous referee at this journal for bringing these studies to my attention.
^11	  For example, in their foundational study on chimpanzee’s theory of mind abilities, Premack and Woodruff (1978) had a chimpanzee watch a video of a human attempting to do something, and they stopped the video before the human achieved the goal. The chimpanzee had to choose from a set of photographs depicting various outcomes, and in 18 of 20 cases the chimpanzee chose the correct photograph, i.e., the photograph that depicted the human completing the goal.
^12	  Though it has been standard wisdom that monkeys’ mirror neurons do not activate during the observation of filmed motor acts, things may be a bit more complex. Caggiano, et al. (2011) recorded the activity of 224 motor neurons in F5 of the monkey brain. Of the 224, 123 (55%) responded to the presentation of motor acts. These are the mirror neurons. Of 123 mirror neurons, 104 (85%) activated while observing naturalistic acts and 50 (41%) to filmed motor acts. 53 neurons out of the 123 mirror neurons (43%) responded both to naturalistic and filmed motor acts, 53 (43%) responded just to naturalistic acts, and 17 (14%) responded just to filmed motor acts. It remains to be seen how to square the Caggiano, et al (2011) study with previous contradictory findings, e.g., Ferrari, et al. (2003).
^13	  For reasons that should be clear by now, I think the titles action and intention are misleading.
^14	  The higher activation while observing the neat version of the intention scene may reflect the fact that drinking is pretty clearly the goal of a hand reaching for a cup in a scene set up as a tea party, whereas the goal of a grasping motion in scene with crumbs and dirty napkins is more ambiguous. The scene does not unequivocally suggest cleaning. Perhaps the hand is reaching for crumbs to eat. Another possibility is that drinking is a more basic action than cleaning, and logically related mirror neurons fire more in response to basic actions. Either way, these results are compatible with my explanation of the results of the study.
^15	  Davidson (2001) argues for this sort of claim in defending anomalous monism.
^16	  A relevant difference here is that naïve action theory denies that intentions are mental states –they are not states at all – whereas the Parma group denies that intentions are mental states. 
